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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON MENS REA FOR 
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Abstract: For decades since the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ landmark de-
cision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Alien Tort Statute has provided tools for 
human rights litigation in American federal courts. Nevertheless, after some con-
troversial decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit in recent 
years, the scope of liability under the statute has diminished and the future of 
ATS human rights litigation is uncertain. In this context, one of the key issues is 
the level of culpability required for a defendant to be liable for assisting the hu-
man rights breaches of a third party. Specifically, the issue is whether the requi-
site mens rea is knowledge or purpose. After surveying the sources that courts 
have looked at to answer this question, this Note concludes that the appropriate 
mens rea standard should be knowledge. 
INTRODUCTION 
A U.S. district court in Georgia awards an Ethiopian citizen half a million 
dollars in damages from a local leader of the former Dergue military junta for 
his involvement in her torture.1 A jury in New York issues a verdict of $750 
million dollars against the president of a self-declared country within Bosnia-
Herzegovina for heinous crimes committed during the Bosnian Civil War.2 
Pfizer enters a settlement of seventy-five million dollars after Nigerian plain-
tiffs sued the company in the United States for illicit, unconsented drug trials 
that led to the disability and death of several children.3 From Paraguayan na-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court’s 
award of compensatory and punitive damages); see also Andrew Rice, The Long Interrogation, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/magazine/04torturer.html?pagewanted=
all&mtrref=www.google.com [https://perma.cc/EDU9-TFSS] (documenting the story of defendant 
Negewo). 
 2 See Verdict Form, Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (PKL), 1–12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000) 
(piling on punitive and compensatory damages against Radovan Karadžić); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (summarizing the allegations made by the plaintiffs); Julian Borger 
& Owen Bowcott, Radovan Karadžić Sentenced to 40 Years for Srebrenica Genocide, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ mar/24/radovan-karadzic-criminally-
responsible-for-genocide-at-srebenica [https://perma.cc/5FAT-UBWQ] (reporting on the recent trial and 
forty-year prison sentence of Karadžić by the United Nations (U.N.) tribunal in The Hague). 
 3 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2009) (outlining the allegations of 
the complaint); Nicole Perlroth, Pfizer Finalizing Settlement in Nigerian Drug Suit, FORBES (Apr. 3, 
2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/03/pfizer-kano-trovan-business-healthcare-settlement.html#
3572ba4026f9 [https://perma.cc/TKB9-2K7S] (reporting on the settlement); see also Sarah Boseley, 
WikiLeaks Cables: Pfizer ‘Used Dirty Tricks to Avoid Clinical Trial Payout,’ THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 
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tionals suing their government officials for torture, to Burmese farmers filing 
class actions against multinational corporations for aiding atrocities by foreign 
militaries, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) provides an important avenue for 
human rights litigation in U.S. federal courts.4 Simply put, the statute gives 
federal district courts jurisdiction over suits by non-citizens for torts in breach 
of international law.5 For foreign victims of inhumane atrocities that come 
from countries that offer no legal recourse, the ATS has been a powerful em-
blem of hope and justice.6 
The significance of the ATS in today’s political climate cannot be over-
stated given the rise of political extremism and its implications for the en-
forcement of human rights worldwide.7 Violations have noticeably been on the 
rise in recent years.8 Thanks to the concerted efforts of human rights organiza-
tions and the media, the culpability of corporate actors in the interconnected 
global economy has increasingly come to light.9 
                                                                                                                           
2010), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-cables-pfizer-nigeria [https://
perma.cc/F2KQ-ZG9Y] (reporting on damning evidence that WikiLeaks had found against Pfizer on 
this matter). 
 4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing federal court jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs); see Alex 
Markels, Showdown for a Tool in Rights Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/06/15/business/showdown-for-a-tool-in-rights-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/UC2Z-YCZM] 
(describing the facts of a case brought by plaintiffs against Unocal under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)); 
Arthur D. Wolf, Filipinos May Sue Marcos in U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1986), https://
www.nytimes.com/1986/03/09/weekinreview/l-filipinos-may-sue-marcos-in-us-courts-494386.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DU8-JB92] (noting the facts of the ATS case brought by Paraguayan plaintiffs). 
 5 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 6 See Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?mtrref=www.google.com 
[https://perma.cc/9R72-DB9J] (quoting Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr., whose father was killed by the Nigerian 
army for his environmental activism, who said “[i]t’s a relief also that we’ve been able to draw a line 
over the past. And from a legal perspective, this historic case means that corporations will have to be 
much more careful”); Dolly Filártiga, American Courts, Global Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/30/opinion/american-courts-global-justice.html [https://perma.cc/
VA49-2ZQF] (“I came to this country in 1978 hoping simply to look a killer in the eye. With the help 
of American law, I got so much more.”). 
 7 See Kenneth Roth, Foreword to HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2018: EVENTS OF 
2017, at viii (2017) (noting the increase in “authoritarian populists” and the subsequent decline in 
human rights enforcement); Salil Shetty, Foreword to AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
REPORT 2017/18: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2018) (noting the “grim conse-
quences for human rights” due to political actors’ recent tendency to “demoniz[e]” people on the basis 
of identity). 
 8 See Marilyn Croser, Human Rights Violations Have Increased 70% Since 2008 Globally, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/sep/09/human-
rights-violations-increase-corporate-responsibility [https://perma.cc/GL2G-EEQM] (noting the dra-
matic increases in human rights breaches between 2008 and 2014). 
 9 See Christine Bader, Companies Commit Human-Rights Abuses in America, Too, THE ATLAN-
TIC (May 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/human-rights-abuses-
happen-in-america-too/371702/ [https://perma.cc/T82T-9DNV] (noting corporate involvement in 
human rights breaches including in the United States); Human Rights Abuses in Your Shopping Bas-
ket, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/sustainable-
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Unfortunately, the scope of ATS litigation has recently begun to dimin-
ish.10 Specifically, in 2013, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel 
II”), the U.S. Supreme Court read into the statute a requirement that claims 
brought through ATS need to “touch and concern” the United States with “suf-
ficient force.”11 A significant volume of ATS litigation prior to Kiobel II had 
involved foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for conduct occurring out-
side the United States, which might not ordinarily meet Kiobel II’s touch and 
concern standard.12 Most recently, 2018, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the 
Court held that “foreign corporations” cannot be liable under the statute.13 
The scope of ATS litigation has been declining since the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision in 2010 in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
(“Kiobel I”) ended all ATS liability for corporations, although that court seems 
to be an outlier.14 This is because many suits under the ATS are brought by for-
eign plaintiffs against international corporations for “aiding and abetting” hu-
man rights breaches by their respective countries.15 Equally relevant to such 
suits is the mens rea standard of ATS liability for aiding and abetting human 
rights breaches, an issue on which U.S. circuit courts are currently split.16 The 
                                                                                                                           
palm-oil-abuse-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/2JYX-BW34] (noting the involvement of brands like Nes-
tle and Unilever in perpetuating child labor); Industry Giants Fail to Tackle Child Labour Allegations 
in Cobalt Battery Supply Chains, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2017/11/industry-giants-fail-to-tackle-child-labour-allegations-in-cobalt-battery-supply-
chains/ [https://perma.cc/89XL-WNSY] (noting leading electronics manufacturers’ involvement in 
“cobalt supply chains” that use child labor and are rife with serious health hazards). 
 10 See infra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 11 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013). 
 12 See Gregory H. Fox & Yunjoo Goze, International Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 92 
MICH. B.J. 44, 45–46 (2013) (noting the prevalence of the foreign plaintiff, defendant, and conduct 
“fact patterns” and Kiobel II’s “restrictive” holding); The Alien Tort Statute: Holding Human Rights 
Abusers Accountable, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, https://earthrights.org/how-we-work/litigation-and-legal-
advocacy/legal-strategies/alien-tort-statute/ [https://perma.cc/6FWB-9ZSU] (noting that while some 
district courts have used Kiobel II broadly to dismiss cases with domestic defendants for domestic 
conduct, other courts have interpreted the opinion very narrowly). 
 13 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402–03, 1408 (2018) (citing “foreign policy” and 
“separation-of-powers” concerns). 
 14 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 
U.S. 108 (2013) (holding that ATS claims against corporations non-actionable); see also Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (Doe VIII) (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(rejecting the Second Circuit’s resolution of ATS corporate liability and noting that several courts have 
been entertaining ATS claims against corporate entities). Doe VIII was overturned on other grounds. Doe 
VIII, 527 F. App’x 7. 
 15 See Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (noting the “proliferation” of corporate aiding and abet-
ting liability claims starting in the “mid-1990s”); EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, supra note 12 (noting the dif-
ference between initial ATS cases against individuals and the later cases against corporate defend-
ants). 
 16 Compare Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 39 (holding knowledge to be the appropriate mens rea for ATS 
aiding and abetting liability), with Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding a purpose requirement for ATS liability for aiding and abetting). 
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split concerns whether knowledge or purpose is the appropriate mens rea.17 
The mens rea issue, which is the topic of this Note, is particularly important 
due to other difficulties that courts have imposed on ATS plaintiffs.18 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the ATS and the relevant Su-
preme Court case law, as well an overview of the circuit split on the mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting liability.19 Part II discusses the various sources 
that courts have looked to determine the appropriate mens rea standard.20 Part 
III synthesizes the various sources discussed in Part II and argues that a 
knowledge mens rea is the proper standard.21 
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON AIDING AND 
ABETTING LIABILITY 
Although the appropriate mens rea for aiding and abetting liability is the 
main preoccupation of this Note, the statute is itself a puzzle worth exploring 
in light of the unclear text and legislative history.22 Section A of this Part dis-
cusses these aspects of the statute as well as the Supreme Court cases interpret-
ing it.23 Section B gives a brief overview of the circuit split before delving into 
why courts disagree in Part II.24 
A. Alien Tort Statute Overview 
The Alien Tort Claims Act, commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute, 
gives federal district courts jurisdiction over suits by non-citizens for torts in 
“violation of the law of nations” or U.S. treaties.25 The sentence-long provision 
was enacted by the First Congress through the Judiciary Act of 1789—a statute 
solely devoted to addressing “federal-court jurisdiction.”26 The wording of the 
ATS has changed very little since its initial incarnation, and the statute gives 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (requiring purpose); Doe v. 
Unocal Corp. (Doe I), 395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d en banc 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(requiring knowledge). 
 18 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–136 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 137–214 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 215–259 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 25–83 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 25–94 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 95–136 and accompanying text. 
 25 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2012); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 
F.3d 104, 113 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the Second Circuit has used Alien Tort Claims Act and 
Alien Tort Statute interchangeably). The U.S. Supreme Court has preferred the latter phrase. See Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the ATS). 
 26 28 U.S.C § 1350; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789) (“[D]istrict courts 
. . . shall also have cognizance . . . of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13 (emphasizing the “jurisdic-
tional nature” of ATS). 
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no further guidance on how courts should interpret its vague jurisdictional 
mandate.27 Modern courts have struggled to understand the meaning of and 
reasons for its enactment because of the lack of legislative history.28 For this 
reason, Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals once 
equated the statute with an enigmatic character in German legend who disap-
pears when asked about where he came.29 To further complicate statutory in-
terpretation, there is a shortage of early judicial decisions because ATS litiga-
tion was rare—the statute was asserted successfully only two times for almost 
two centuries after its enactment.30 
The ATS was revived and brought into prominence in 1980 by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.31 The case in-
volved foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant for conduct alleged to have 
occurred outside the United States after locating and serving the defendant in-
side U.S. borders.32 The plaintiffs claimed that Pena, a then high-ranking po-
lice officer in Paraguay, had abducted, tortured, and killed their son/brother 
because of his father’s political ideologies and involvements.33 
The key issue before the court was whether or not torture violated the 
“law of nations,” giving the court subject matter jurisdiction.34 Citing old Su-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See 28 U.S.C § 1350 (using very few words to outline broad, general principles). 
 28 See id.; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713, 718–19 (finding congressional intent behind the “terse provi-
sion” hard to pin down because of the lack of records of “congressional discussion” and debate, or any 
meaningful changes in redrafting); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (noting that there are no traces of Senate debates on the Judiciary Act, and the House debate 
does not reference the ATS). 
 29 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as a 
“legal Lohengrin”); Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide 
Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 123 n.15 (2007) 
(elaborating on the meaning of the term “Lohengrin”). 
 30 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (noting that 28 U.S.C § 1350 was successfully applied in only one 
instance in its first 170 years); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 587, 588 (2002) (noting two successful cases of ATS jurisdiction before 1980, in 1795 and 
then in 1961); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries 
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985) (finding and documenting 
twenty-one cases in which plaintiffs sought ATS jurisdiction before 1980). 
 31 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the ATS was rarely used before Filartiga); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture carried out “under color of official authority” is a violation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1350, whatever the citizenship of the litigants); Bradley, supra note 30, at 589 (noting that 
Filartiga made it possible to litigate worldwide human rights issues in American federal courts); Fox 
& Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (noting the “floodgate” of human rights lawsuits unleashed by Filarti-
ga); Joe Lodico, Note, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 30 J.L. 
& COM. 117, 121 (2012) (commenting that Filartiga revived the ATS from “dormancy”). 
 32 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79. 
 33 Id. at 878. 
 34 Id. at 880. “The law of nations,” also known as “international law,” consists of rules agreed to 
by the “community” of nations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. L. 
INST. 1987). It can be found in written agreements. Id. But international law also consists of “general 
2958 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2953 
preme Court precedents, Filartiga held that the “law of nations” could be un-
covered by observing the writings of jurists, practices prevalent in the interna-
tional community, and court opinions.35 Upon examining the United Nations 
(U.N.) Charter and declarations, international treaties and agreements, and the 
works of various legal commentators, the court concluded that the law of na-
tions forbids torture.36 The court ultimately found all of the ingredients of the 
ATS—(1) a civil lawsuit by a noncitizen, (2) for a tort related to a breach of 
international law—were present.37 Accordingly, the court reversed the district 
court’s finding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction.38 Following remand, 
the district court granted a default judgment for $10.3 million to the plain-
tiffs.39 
Filartiga initiated a culture of foreign human rights lawsuits in American 
federal courts.40 At least thirty lawsuits were brought under the ATS between 
1980 and 1997, with a number of them resulting in victories for plaintiffs.41 A 
majority of these cases initially involved foreign plaintiffs charging foreign 
government officers with foreign human rights atrocities—facts similar to 
those in Filartiga.42 Subsequently, starting in the mid-1990s, plaintiffs began 
to sue corporations under theories of accessory liability for their involvements 
with various foreign governments in committing human rights atrocities.43 For 
example, in 2010 in Doe v. Nestle, citizens of Mali brought suit against Nestle 
                                                                                                                           
and consistent” practices of nations. Id. Such practices can be inferred through decisions of interna-
tional courts, works of legal commentators, U.N. resolutions, and more. Id. § 103. 
 35 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81; see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that 
the “law of nations” is part of U.S. law and that such law may be determined from the writings of 
jurists and scholars writing on common practices of various nations); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 
(1 Wheat.)153, 160–61 (1820) (outlining the sources of international law). 
 36 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–84. 
 37 Id. at 887. 
 38 Id. at 878. 
 39 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 40 Bradley, supra note 30, at 589 (commenting on Filartiga’s impact on human rights litigation); 
Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (noting the “floodgates” of human rights lawsuits after Filartiga); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991) (compar-
ing Filartiga to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in the context of global human 
rights enforcement in American courts). 
 41 Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 
1487 (2014) (finding thirty-two lawsuits under the ATS during the relevant time). 
 42 Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-
Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 460 (2011) (remarking on 
the similarity of early ATS cases with the facts of Filartiga—foreign plaintiffs suing foreign govern-
ments for human rights atrocities that occurred outside the United States); Fox & Goze, supra note 12, 
at 45 (describing the fact patterns of early cases brought under the ATS after Filartiga). 
 43 Bradley, supra note 30, at 589 (noting the recent increase in ATS lawsuits against corpora-
tions); Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 42, at 460 (noting that corporations have been defendants in 
at least 155 cases under the ATS since the mid-90s with six to ten such cases filed yearly); Fox & 
Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (commenting on the popularity of the “second generation” of ATS claims 
brought against corporate defendants). 
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in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for aiding and 
abetting, among other things, slavery and child labor on cocoa fields in Côte 
d’Ivoire.44 This type of litigation became popular because corporations, unlike 
government officers, are more likely to have deep pockets and are more likely 
to have agents in the United States who can be served with process.45 Although 
many of the early lawsuits failed, some led to incredibly large money judg-
ments, which plaintiffs were unable to recover because of absentee defend-
ants.46 Some commentators have remarked, however, that “intangible justice” 
was the real victory in those cases.47 
Almost twenty years after Filartiga, in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court fi-
nally provided guidance on the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.48 By this 
time, Filartiga had received mixed reactions from commentators and federal 
judges.49 At a high level of abstraction, the facts of Sosa are similar to those in 
Filartiga: a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant for foreign conduct.50 
Here, the alleged conduct was false arrest.51 One of the chief issues before the 
court was the petitioner’s argument that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that 
cannot provide substantive relief without Congress making specific interna-
tional law violations cognizable.52 
In Sosa, the Court partly agreed with the petitioner’s argument, emphasiz-
ing the “jurisdictional nature” of 28 U.S.C § 1350 as evidenced by its place-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 45 Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 45. 
 46 See Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 42, at 460 (commenting on the success of early ATS 
litigation); Stephens, supra note 41, at 1487–90 (noting the successes and failures and the inability of 
successful ATS litigants to “collect judgments”). 
 47 See Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 42, at 460 (commenting on importance of wins for ATS 
plaintiffs notwithstanding their inability to recover money judgments); Stephens, supra note 41, at 
1489–90 (noting that many plaintiffs felt “vindicated” because their ATS wins “created a record of 
what they had endured”). 
 48 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–31 (interpreting the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1350 in light of histori-
cal evidence); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 361 (2011) (noting Sosa’s role in de-
termining the “future of the ATS”). 
 49 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 822 (Bork, J., concurring) (critiquing Filartiga’s interpretation of the 
ATS because of its tension with Articles I and II of the Constitution, which grant both the federal 
legislature and the executive responsibility over “foreign relations”); Ku, supra note 48, at 359–60 
(documenting the various criticisms of Filartiga from scholars and judges based on “federalism” and 
“separation of powers” concerns). 
 50 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–99 (highlighting the facts of the case). 
 51 Id. at 698. In Sosa, the plaintiff alleged that he had been arbitrarily detained overnight by the 
defendant, who captured the plaintiff from his home and delivered him to U.S. authorities. Id. The 
defendant had been recruited by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) for this operation after a grand 
jury indictment against the plaintiff for his involvement in the “torture and murder” of a DEA agent in 
Mexico. Id. at 697–98. The plaintiff brought a civil lawsuit with claims arising from the ATS, among 
other causes of action, after his “acquittal” and subsequent return to Mexico. Id. at 698–99. 
 52 Id. at 713–14 (summarizing the petitioner’s emphasis on the “jurisdictional nature” of the ATS, 
arguing that the statute does not let courts create new causes of action). 
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ment by the First Congress within a jurisdictional statute.53 Drawing inferences 
from a very limited historical context, the Court held that the First Congress 
did not think of the ATS as a “shelf” provision to which a future legislature 
would provide substantive remedies under the statute’s jurisdictional man-
date.54 Sosa held instead that the First Congress understood the statute to pro-
vide jurisdiction for a very limited number of acts, specifically those interna-
tional law violations already cognizable under the common law at the time.55 
The Court specifically referred to conducts mentioned in Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries: (1) “offenses against ambassadors”; (2) “violations of safe con-
duct”; and (3) “piracy.”56 
In spite of the First Congress’ narrow understanding of the scope of the 
ATS, the Court noted no case or statute since the ATS’ birth actually prohibits 
federal courts from acknowledging new ATS causes of action based on con-
temporary international law.57 The Court noted, nonetheless, the need to be 
careful in light of changing norms around the common law, the potential fric-
tion with Congress and the President on issues related to foreign relations, and 
the limited authority of Article III courts.58 Hence, the Court held that new 
causes of action alleging contemporary international law violations must be 
“accepted by the civilized world” and “defined with a specificity,” like the 
eighteenth century counterparts that the Court mentioned.59 The Court then 
endorsed Filartiga’s approach of finding credible, authoritative sources of in-
ternational law.60 Finally, based on the standard articulated, the Court found 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 713 (remarking that the Judiciary Act of 1789 dealt only with Article III court jurisdiction 
and that the architects of the ATS would have likely paid attention to this fact). 
 54 Id. at 714–19 (citing Congress’s fears about the federal government’s inability to enforce the 
violations of the “law of nations”); see Company, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defin-
ing “shelf company” as one which is created without any current goals but with the anticipation of 
future needs). In particular, the Court noted that the Continental Congress was worried that it could 
not enforce its treaties or provide remedies for “offenses against ambassadors” to the point of urging 
state legislatures to adopt legislation to make such conduct actionable. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716. The 
advice was heeded only by the Connecticut legislature. Id. The Court made much of the fact that Oli-
ver Ellsworth, one of the main drafters of the ATS, was a member of that very legislature. Id. at 719. 
 55 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *68 and early references to the ATS for this conclusion); see BLACKSTONE, supra (discuss-
ing the “law of nations”). Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England is the “most authorita-
tive treatise” on the English common law. Randy J. Holland, Anglo-American Templars: Common 
Law Crusaders, 8 DEL. L. REV. 137, 144–45 (2006). 
 56 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
 57 Id. at 724–25. 
 58 See id. at 725–28 (citing—among other reasons—the legal community’s shifting views on the 
common law, the Erie doctrine, and Supreme Court case law to support the view that courts should 
exercise restraint). 
 59 Id. at 725; see supra note 56 and accompanying text (listing the eighteenth century counter-
parts). 
 60 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733–34 (incorporating the Court’s guidance in The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. at 700, for appropriate sources for uncovering the “law of nations”); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d 
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that respondent’s claims of “arbitrary arrest” was not a principle of internation-
al law sufficiently “defined” or “accepted” to warrant acknowledging a new 
cause of action.61 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa was widely debated in the years fol-
lowing the decision.62 Ostensibly, Sosa stands for the narrowing of the types of 
claims that can be brought under the ATS.63 The demanding acceptance and 
specificity requirements as laid out and applied by Sosa for determining ac-
tionable breaches international law stand in contrast with previous courts’ ap-
proaches.64 On the other hand, Sosa spoke very favorably of, and claimed to be 
consistent with, those prior decisions that had utilized approaches contrary to 
the one adopted by the Sosa court.65 
Almost a decade later, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the 
ATS once again in its controversial decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrole-
um Co. (Kiobel II).66 In that case, Nigerian citizens living in the United States 
brought suit against foreign oil companies for aiding and abetting Nigeria’s 
human rights breaches.67 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporations pro-
vided logistical support to the Nigerian security forces as they engaged in, 
among other things, unlawful executions, atrocities, and torture, while re-
                                                                                                                           
at 880–81 (citing The Paquete Habana for the same); supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing sources of international law). 
 61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–38. 
 62 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2011) (noting the disagreements and uncertainty among district 
courts and academics about the guidance provided by Sosa); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 897 (2007) (re-
marking that Sosa’s holding left uncertainties with the “sources and scope” of remedies available); 
Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (noting the uncertainties left behind by Sosa, including the limits of 
corporate liability); Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, 
and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 22–31 (2007) (documenting some of the divergent read-
ings of Sosa by different scholars). 
 63 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (advising restraint in recognizing cognizable claims under interna-
tional law); Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for 
Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
393, 493–94 (2006) (predicting that under Sosa only claims of “summary and extrajudicial execu-
tion,” “torture,” and “racial discrimination” will be recognized). 
 64 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736 n.27 (finding the result of a scholar’s survey about the international 
community’s rejection of “arbitrary detention” too general); Bradley et al., supra note 62, at 897 (re-
marking that before Sosa, lower courts did not scrutinize the source of international law, which 
changed after the Court’s landmark decision). 
 65 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (declaring that the Court’s decision was in line with what courts had 
been doing for decades since Filartiga was decided); Bradley et al., supra note 62, at 901 (noting 
Sosa’s endorsement of previous decisions by the courts below). 
 66 See Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 124; Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 46 (noting that academics have 
criticized the rule of statutory interpretation invoked in Kiobel); Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t 
Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1471, 1486–87 (2014) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s backward views for failing to recognize 
the interconnectedness among nation states). 
 67 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 111–12. 
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sponding to environmental protests on Nigerian oil fields.68 The Court initially 
granted certiorari on the issue of corporate liability after the Second Circuit in 
Kiobel (“Kiobel I”) held that corporate liability as a principle of international 
law lacks the acceptance and specificity required by Sosa.69 Avoiding this 
question altogether, the Court subsequently directed its attention to the issue of 
when, if at all, the ATS permits claims arising from conduct outside the United 
States.70 
To understand the ATS’s reach outside U.S. borders, the Court relied on a 
rule of statutory construction known as the “presumption against extraterritori-
al application.”71 As its name suggests, the rule holds that a statute is not appli-
cable outside U.S. territory if it does not explicitly say so.72 Referencing its 
own case law indicating that the presumption is meant for “merit questions” 
and not jurisdictional ones, the Court nonetheless extended the rule to analyze 
the ATS.73 To support this extension of the law, the Court cited the presump-
tion’s underlying concern: Article III judges interfering in the sphere of foreign 
relations.74 Accordingly, the Court held that ATS claims need to “touch and 
concern” the United States with “sufficient force” to rebut the presumption.75 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court found that the alleged conduct had 
occurred outside U.S. borders and that the corporate defendants’ presence in 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 113–14. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that military and police battered, sexually 
assaulted, murdered, and detained protestors and pillaged their property. Id. According to the plain-
tiffs, the defendant corporations shared culpability because they solicited the Nigerian government’s 
help in quelling the protests; supplied food, vehicles, and money; and gave the military access to their 
property to coordinate operations. Id. 
 69 Id. at 114; Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 120 (finding that corporate liability is not a valid principle of 
international law). 
 70 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 114. Corporate liability under ATS claims remains unresolved. Compare 
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145 (finding the lack of a widely accepted international norm imposing corporate 
liability), with Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 57 (rejecting Exxon’s claim that corporations are not subject to 
ATS suits and finding Kiobel I to be an outlier in ATS jurisprudence). 
 71 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 116–17. The cannon is rooted in the belief that American law does not 
regulate sovereign territories outside of its boundaries. Id. at 115. The presumption helps avoid con-
flict between American laws and the laws of foreign countries. Id. It is normally used to figure out if 
congressional legislation has any force outside the United States. Id. 
 72 Id.; see also David Keenan & Sabrina P. Shroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterrito-
riality Seriously in Criminal Cases After Morrison and Kiobel, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 80 (2013) 
(noting that the presumption helps check on judicial activism). 
 73 Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 116 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 252–53 
(2010)) (noting that the Court usually utilizes the principle to examine if congressional legislation that 
regulates conduct has force outside the United States). 
 74 Id. But see id. at 129 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the presumption, which ordinarily 
prevents judicial interference in the sphere of Congress’s authority, is inappropriate in the context of 
the ATS as it was explicitly adopted by Congress to deal with “foreign matters”). 
 75 Id. at 124–25 (majority opinion). 
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the United States alone was not enough to rebut the presumption.76 According-
ly, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment on alternative grounds.77 
The Kiobel II decision changed ATS litigation drastically by creating a 
radical shift from Filartiga and its progeny and causing suits involving foreign 
litigants over foreign conduct to become suspect.78 Kiobel II’s guidance is not 
clear, however, and there is still a lot of room for uncertainty.79 Commentators 
have been eager to speculate on what is left for human rights litigation under 
the ATS after the Kiobel II decision.80 Some commentators have made much of 
the Breyer and Kennedy concurrences, which respectively suggest that juris-
diction is proper when “American interests” are at stake, and that there might 
be cases untouched by Kiobel’s holding.81 Others have tried to distinguish Ki-
obel’s holding, emphasizing the distinction between “F-cubed” fact patterns—
involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct—and “F-
squared” fact patterns—where one of these foreign elements is replaced with a 
domestic one.82 Some have even suggested moving human rights litigation 
towards state courts, where long-established tort actions might be available.83 
The most recent blow to human rights litigation under ATS has come from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC in 2018.84 In 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of Transnational 
Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1097 (2014) (remarking on Kiobel II’s determinative impact on 
ATS litigation); Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 46 (noting that cases like Filartiga, which involve 
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign government officers for foreign conduct, probably do not meet Kiobel 
II’s “touch and concern” requirement); Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1496 (noting that the Kiobel II 
court might have ended Filartiga’s legacy). 
 79 See Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (commenting that the Kiobel II majori-
ty was scrupulous to save important questions about the overall scope of the ATS for later); Alford, 
supra note 78, at 1098 (observing that Kiobel II does not inform district courts how to apply the touch 
and concern requirement); Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1505 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow read-
ing” of Kiobel II). 
 80 See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1505–07 (speculating on what types of cases similar to 
Filartiga might be distinguishable from Kiobel II); Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien 
Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 186–89 (2013) (noting several ave-
nues left for ATS plaintiffs after Kiobel II). 
 81 See, e.g., Edna Chinyele Udobong, Post-Kiobel: What Remedies Exist for Foreign Victims of 
Corporate Human Rights Violations?, 11 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 559, 580–81 (2016) (finding some room 
for optimism in Kiobel II’s concurring opinions). 
 82 See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1505–07 (conjuring up hypothetical scenarios—such as Irani-
an secret agents torturing an Iranian immigrant in the United States—distinguishable from the facts of 
Kiobel II); Winkler, supra note 80, at 187–89 (noting “F-squared” scenarios and other fact patterns 
that might survive Kiobel II). 
 83 See Alford, supra note 78, at 1099 (remarking that actions underlying human rights abuses are 
always covered in one form or another by tort law); Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 46 (noting state 
remedies as viable alternative to human rights litigation under ATS and that there are “parallel” tort 
law remedies for most human rights breaches). 
 84 See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that non-U.S. corporations cannot be liable under the 
ATS). 
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that case, foreign citizens sued a Jordanian bank with offices worldwide for 
helping terrorist organizations by letting them maintain bank accounts.85 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit based on Ki-
obel I’s ending of ATS corporate liability, holding that Kiobel I was still good 
law despite the Supreme Court’s affirmance on alternative grounds in Kiobel 
II.86 The Supreme Court once again granted certiorari on the question of corpo-
rate liability.87 
A five-member majority agreed that non-U.S. corporate defendants are 
not subject to ATS liability.88 The justices, however, could not agree on the 
underlying rationale.89 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion employed Sosa’s 
two-prong analysis.90 On the first prong, the plurality noted that the lack of the 
requisite “specific, universal, and obligatory” international principle regarding 
corporate liability.91 The Court cited a number of international courts whose 
jurisdictions did not extend beyond “natural persons.”92 On the second prong, 
the plurality found that letting the lawsuit go forward would not be within the 
court’s sound discretion given the foreign policy and “separation-of-powers” 
problems hiding behind the case.93 At the other extreme, Justice Gorsuch, con-
curring in judgment, remarked that Sosa was a mistake and that Congress, not 
Article III courts, should decide what is cognizable under ATS.94 
B. Circuit Split: Appropriate Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting 
While the scope of ATS litigation has been steadily declining, an im-
portant question remains: what should be the correct mens rea for aiding and 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 1394. One of the allegations, for instance, was that Arab Bank had allowed an account 
which was used by Hamas to compensate the relatives of suicide bombers. Id. 
 86 In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 151–58 (2d Cir. 2015) (discuss-
ing at length the impact of Kiobel II on Kiobel I’s holding). 
 87 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017) (mem) (granting certiorari). 
 88 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1393, 1407 (announcing the judgment of the five-member majority). 
 89 See infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 90 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399. The first prong in assessing whether an action is cognizable under 
the ATS requires asking if the allegation involves a breach of a “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
international norm. Id. Second, a court must ask whether letting the case move forward is within the 
court’s sound discretion or whether the court must exercise restraint absent congressional action. Id. 
 91 Id. at 1399–1402. The plurality cited footnote twenty from Sosa to conclude that the first prong 
applies equally to the questions of who can be liable. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20). 
 92 Id. The Court cited the Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, the statutes for the international 
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, among others, to show that the jurisdiction 
of these bodies extend to “natural persons” only, not corporations. Id. 
 93 Id. at 1402–07 (noting the recent diplomatic tensions between the United States and sovereign 
nations as a result of ATS litigation). 
 94 Id. at 1412–14 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (taking a radical stance and calling for an end to “ATS 
exceptionalism”). 
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abetting liability under the statute?95 This question is significant because most 
ATS lawsuits against corporate actors rely on accessory liability.96 Section A 
provided a historical overview of the ATS.97 This Section addresses the mens 
rea circuit split that will drive the rest of this Note.98 Before delving into the 
subject, however, this Section will summarize the doctrinal aspects of aiding 
and abetting liability.99 
1. Aiding and Abetting: The Doctrine 
Aiding and abetting liability is a well-established principle in criminal 
law.100 The doctrine extends criminality beyond those who actually commit pun-
ishable offenses to their accomplices.101 It is a basic rule of criminal law that 
criminal intentions alone, without any criminal actions, are not punishable.102 
Similarly, while bad acts alone are sometimes punishable, that is generally not 
the case absent the “guilty mind.”103 Therefore, any offense must consist of a 
mental element (“mens rea”) and an accompanying act (“actus reus”).104 Keep-
ing in line with these doctrinal principles, aiding and abetting liability generally 
requires an actor to act to advance a crime—by ordering, persuading, helping—
with some level of culpability—knowingly, purposefully, or otherwise.105 While 
aiding and abetting has its roots in criminal law, tort law also recognizes this 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Compare Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 654 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (adopting the purpose 
standard), and Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1087–88 (same), with Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 
2d 1322, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (adopting the knowledge standard). 
 96 Fox & Goze, supra note 12, at 45 (explaining how ATS suits are typically brought against 
corporate defendants). 
 97 See supra notes 25–83 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 109–136 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 100–108 and accompanying text. 
 100 See Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 72 (2014) (noting the common-law recognition 
of aiding and abetting); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 
(1994) (noting aiding and abetting’s “ancient” roots); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making it illegal 
to help, assist, recommend, order, or encourage someone to commit a crime). 
 101 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (AM. L. INST., Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985) 
(prescribing the standard of liability for the actions of a third party); 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHAR-
TON’S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 31–33 (15th ed. 2017) (describing principles of accessory liability including 
aiding and abetting). 
 102 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (requiring “voluntary act” or “omission” for criminal liabil-
ity); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1 (3d ed. 2017) (noting that negative 
intentions are not crimes in and of themselves, and that an action or lack thereof in the face of legal 
obligation is necessary); TORCIA, supra note 101, § 25 (remarking that having bad intentions is not a 
crime unless “the evil thinker becomes an evil doer”). 
 103 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (outlining the various standard of mental culpability); LAFA-
VE supra note 102, § 5.1 (mentioning strict liability crimes); TORCIA, supra note 101, § 27 (noting the 
mens rea requirement); see also Mens Rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (using mens 
rea synonymously with the “guilty mind”). 
 104 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 105 LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 13.2 (discussing the various formulations of actus reus and mens 
rea required for “accomplice liability”). 
2966 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2953 
theory of liability.106 And although this doctrine evolved from the common law, 
federal and international law both recognize it.107 ATS aiding and abetting is 
complex because it involves a federal tort remedy for breaches of international 
human rights principles, which generally involve criminal law.108 
2. The Circuit Split 
As indicated in Section A of this Part, the more recent movement in ATS 
litigation has involved victims of human rights breaches bringing suits against 
corporate actors.109 Often, such lawsuits use accessory liability to argue that 
corporate actors aided and abetted foreign governments in committing atroci-
ties.110 Courts have unanimously indicated that international law supports aid-
ing and abetting liability under the ATS.111 Even so, there has been notable 
disagreement regarding the legal standards that should apply in assessing such 
liability.112 
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit first tackled the issue in Doe I v. Unocal Cor-
poration.113 In that case, Burmese residents sued Unocal, a California corpora-
tion, for its entanglement in coerced labor, sexual assault, torture, and killing 
when Unocal set up a gas pipeline in Myanmar.114 As a preliminary matter, the 
court held that international law ought to provide guidance not only on the 
                                                                                                                           
 106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. L. INST. 1979) (extending tort liability for 
third party conduct for knowingly helping someone violate their duty). 
 107 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (extending accessory liability for federal crimes); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 
272–75 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (documenting aiding and abetting in international law, including 
decisions from Nuremberg and various international tribunals). 
 108 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing federal jurisdiction in civil lawsuits for tortious conduct in 
breach of international law); Doe I, 395 F.3d at 968 (noting the extent to which human rights princi-
ples have been created in the criminal law domain). 
 109 Bradley, supra note 30, at 589 (observing the increase in lawsuits involving corporations); 
Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 42, at 460 (noting the rise in ATS litigation against corporate ac-
tors). 
 110 See infra notes 113–136 and accompanying text. 
 111 See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 19 (remarking that practically all courts that have looked into the 
question have said that aiding and abetting is a valid theory under international law); see also Presby-
terian Church, 582 F.3d at 259 (recognizing ATS aiding and abetting liability); Khulumani, 504 F.3d 
at 260 (approving ATS aiding and abetting liability). 
 112 See infra notes 113–136 and accompanying text. 
 113 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 947. The decision was subsequently vacated after a settlement was reached. 
See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating the judgment); Ryan S. Lin-
coln, Note, To Proceed with Caution? Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 604, 612 (2010) (noting the lack of clarity on ATS aiding and abetting liability 
in the Ninth Circuit due to the settlement). 
 114 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 936. The plaintiffs claimed that Myanmar’s armed forces had made them 
perform labor against their will on a gas pipeline plan that Unocal was involved in. Id. at 939–40. 
Testimony suggested that the armed forces had also engaged in sexual assault, torture, and killing. Id. 
Evidence suggested that Unocal had hired and paid the armed forces to get security for its project. Id. 
at 952. 
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presence of federal jurisdiction but also on the substantive standard of liabil-
ity.115 The court turned to case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) for guidance.116 Ultimately, the court held that ATS aiding 
and abetting liability required a mens rea of knowledge and an actus reus of 
“practical assistance or encouragement.”117 Interestingly, in his concurring 
opinion, Judge Reinhardt disagreed with the majority that international law 
governs accessory liability under the ATS.118 The judge noted that while the 
ATS clearly points to international law to ascertain actionable torts, it does not 
say anything about “ancillary issues” like accessory liability for those torts.119 
He stated that courts ought to look at federal common law ideas like agency.120 
The Second Circuit similarly addressed ATS aiding and abetting liability 
in 2007 in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.121 In Khulumani, South 
African plaintiffs sued several dozen corporations for helping the South Afri-
can government enforce apartheid.122 In a unanimous decision, the court re-
versed the district court’s judgment that international law does not support aid-
ing and abetting liability under the ATS, without clarifying the actual standard 
to be applied.123 In their concurring opinions, two of the judges sharply disa-
greed over the standard.124 Looking towards international law—specifically the 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 949. 
 116 Id. at 949–51. The court synthesized the standard of liability based on Prosecutor v. Furundzija 
and Prosecutor v. Musema, both of which applied knowledge as the appropriate standard of mens rea. 
Id.; see Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR–96–13–T (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT–95–17/1 T 
(Dec. 10, 1998). 
 117 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 951. 
 118 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (siding in favor of the federal common law approach). 
Judge Reinhardt noted that federal common law was a better way to answer “ancillary legal ques-
tions” related to congressional legislation. Id. at 963, 965–66. 
 119 Id. at 965. 
 120 Id. at 969. 
 121 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. 
 122 Id. at 258. Plaintiffs consisted of a South African non-profit that helped those affected by 
apartheid, and almost one hundred representatives and actual sufferers of murder, torture, sexual vio-
lence, shootings, and captivity. Id. at 258 n.1. The defendants included about fifty named and about 
one hundred unnamed corporate actors. Id. at 258. 
 123 Id. at 260 (reversing the district court’s decision); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting ATS aiding and abetting liability finding it “dubious at 
best”). The district court refused to follow the decisions of various international courts—the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), Nuremberg, and others—as well as the International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, finding that the decisions of tribunals were not bind-
ing and that the Convention had not been adopted by the powerful industrial nations. In re S. African 
Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 549–50. The Second Circuit reversed the decision without much 
explanation. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. One of the concurring judges, however, explicitly rejected 
the district court’s analysis citing those same sources of international law that the district court had 
dismissed. Id. at 271–75 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 124 See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—Judge Katzmann found 
purpose was the appropriate mens rea.125 Judge Hall disagreed with this ap-
proach, finding that federal common law should guide the court.126 Citing 
Judge Reinhardt’s analysis in Doe I, he examined Supreme Court case law in-
corporating knowledge as the appropriate mens rea for civil aiding and abet-
ting, as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.127 
Subsequent circuit court decisions have produced conflicting results on 
the mens rea issue.128 The Second Circuit in 2009 in Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. and the Fourth Circuit in 2011 in Aziz v. Al-
colac, Inc. held purpose to be the appropriate standard.129 The D.C. Circuit in 
2011 in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., however, found knowledge to be suffi-
cient.130 In light of the wide variety of conclusions and rationales that appellate 
opinions have produced, it is not at all surprising that district courts have also 
failed to reach an agreement.131 For instance, in 2010 in Doe v. Nestle, S.A., the 
District Court for the Central District of California held purpose to be the accu-
rate mens rea, finding that while the knowledge mens rea appears in some bod-
ies of international law, it does not meet Sosa’s high bar for acceptance.132 
Similarly, the same year in Abecassis v. Wyatt, the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas reached the same conclusion, finding the Second Circuit’s 
logic in Presbyterian Church Of Sudan to be convincing.133 In contrast, eight 
years earlier, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Me-
hinovic v. Vuckovic found that knowledge was the appropriate mens rea stand-
                                                                                                                           
 125 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (finding third party liability for 
giving practical help that has “substantial effect” on that crime being committed). 
 126 Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring) (suggesting that Article III courts should look toward their 
own common law). 
 127 Id. at 287–88 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (b) and finding knowledge to 
be the appropriate mens rea). 
 128 See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. 
 129 Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401(finding purpose as the appropriate mens rea); Presbyterian Church, 582 
F.3d at 259 (finding purpose to be the correct standard). 
 130 Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 39 (holding knowledge to be the appropriate mens rea). 
 131 Compare Abecassis, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (adopting the purpose standard), and Nestle, 748 
F. Supp. 2d at 1087–88 (same), with Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (adopting the knowledge 
standard). 
 132 Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1087. Plaintiffs alleged that Nestle supported breaches of human 
rights including coerced labor by very young children on cocoa fields in the Ivory Coast, which re-
duced the cost of labor for the defendants. Id. at 1064. They further claimed that Nestle had primary 
knowledge of these acts as well as the “economic leverage” to stop these acts from happening. Id. at 
1066. 
 133 Abecassis, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 654. In Abecassis, plaintiffs comprised victims or relatives of 
victims of terrorist bombings that happened in Israel. Id. at 626–27. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant 
corporations bought petroleum products from Saddam Hussein, paying bribes to him by transferring 
money into his Jordanian bank account, which he used to compensate the relatives of those involved 
in the terrorist bombings. Id. at 627. 
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ard.134 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on case law from the IC-
TY.135 The Supreme Court, unfortunately, has not provided any roadmap.136 
II. COMPETING SOURCES FOR STANDARD OF LIABILITY 
Part of the reason why courts are split on the mens rea for ATS aiding and 
abetting is because of the disagreement amongst judges regarding whether to 
look at federal common law or international law for the appropriate stand-
ard.137 Even when there is agreement on the choice-of-law issue, there are con-
tradicting authorities within a given body of law.138 Section A of this Part ex-
plores the choice-of-law problem.139 Section B discusses the appropriate mens 
rea for aiding and abetting liability under the federal common law approach.140 
Section C defines the “law of nations” and explores various sources that point 
to differing standards of mens rea.141 
A. Choice of Law Problem 
The choice of law for ATS aiding and abetting liability has largely been 
resolved in favor of international law.142 But in the early days after the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, courts disa-
greed on whether American tort law, tort law of the country where the tort oc-
curred, or international law should provide the standards governing ATS litiga-
tion.143 Circuit courts that have looked at this issue after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004 agree that courts should 
look at international law to find the appropriate standard for ATS aiding and 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. In Mehinovic, plaintiffs were asylum seekers from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina who alleged that defendant, Vuckovic, a “Bosnian Serb” army man, performed hei-
nous acts as part of the “ethnic cleansing” of non-Serbs. Id. at 1329. 
 135 Id. at 1356 (noting the more lenient mens rea requirement under ICTY precedents). 
 136 See Udobong, supra note 81, at 602 (noting the Supreme Court’s silence on the relevant is-
sue); Angela Walker, Note, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute the Mens Rea 
Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Is Knowledge, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 119, 144 
(2011) (noting that aiding and abetting could be an upcoming focus for the Supreme Court). 
 137 See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 163–214 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 155–162 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 163–214 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text. 
 143 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the confu-
sion among courts on the “choice-of-law question”). In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit 
after reversing the district court, suggested that the district court might have to conduct a choice-of-
law analysis. See 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). This led to a wide disagreement among courts. 
See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding the district court’s decision to apply Philippine law); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (advocating for common law torts approach); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 
886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (proposing international law as the solution). 
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abetting liability.144 This theory was advanced by Judge Katzmann in 2007 in 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd. in the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals where he pointed to a footnote in Sosa to find support for that proposi-
tion.145 The footnote suggests that the law of nations governs the breadth of 
ATS liability, as in whether non-state actors can be sued.146 Judge Katzmann 
inferred from this footnote that the law of nations should also govern the issue 
of who can be sued for the bad acts of another.147 At least two circuit judges 
have dismissed Sosa’s supposed resolution of the choice-of-law question as 
dicta.148 That view, however, is the minority in circuit courts.149 
For those whom the issue remains unresolved, tension exists between 
whether federal common law or the international law should guide ATS liabil-
ity for aiding and abetting.150 Circuit judges disagreeing on this question have 
looked towards the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for resolution but 
have come to opposite conclusions.151 The Restatement urges courts to consid-
er a number of factors: (1) the community of state and nations’ best interests; 
(2) the forum’s stance; (3) concerned states’ stance on the specific issue; (4) 
reasonable expectations of litigants; (5) the goals of the area of the law at is-
sue; (6) foreseeability and consistency of outcomes; and (7) the simplicity with 
which the controlling law can be ascertained.152 The limits placed on federal 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 398 
(4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Sosa points to international law for ascertaining aiding and abetting re-
quirements); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe VIII), 654 F.3d 11, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (pointing to 
Sosa for the same conclusion ); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 
259 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding the same). 
 145 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring) (resolving the choice of law question in favor of international law because the result com-
ports with a footnote of Sosa); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20 (noting that international law might 
be relevant to the question of who can be sued under the ATS); Teddy Nemeroff, Note, Untying the 
Khulumani Knot: Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act After 
Sosa, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231, 245–50 (2008) (discussing “footnote twenty”). 
 146 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. 
 147 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (explaining the import of the Sosa 
footnote for the choice-of-law inquiry); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. 
 148 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) 
(siding with Judge Hall’s view in Khulumani); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 286 (Hall, J., concurring) 
(noting that Sosa’s take on this issue is simply dicta). 
 149 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 771 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (favoring federal common law); Khu-
lumani, 504 F.3d at 286 (Hall, J., concurring) (favoring federal common law); Doe v. Unocal Corp. 
(Doe I), 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (favoring federal common law); 
supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 151 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. L. INST. 1971). Compare Doe 
I, 395 F.3d at 949 (finding that the Restatement points towards the international law), with id. at 967–
68 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (finding that the Restatement favors federal common law). 
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (listing choice-of-law considerations in 
the absence of a clear “statutory directive”). 
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courts from creating common law is an important background consideration.153 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has authorized the creation of federal 
common law under special situations, such as filling in the blanks in laws cre-
ated by Congress, especially when the United States’ relations with other na-
tions are at issue.154 
B. Federal Common Law 
Circuit judges that look to federal common law to assess ATS aiding and 
abetting liability agree that knowledge is the appropriate mens rea, citing Su-
preme Court case law.155 In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., the Supreme Court referred to the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ opinion in Halberstam v. Welch as a “comprehensive” authority on 
aiding and abetting liability in the civil context.156 Halberstam involved an 
appeal from a finding of joint and several liability against a woman whose 
partner killed the plaintiff’s husband while robbing his home.157 She was found 
responsible for her involvement in her partner’s theft operation.158 In affirming 
the district court’s decision based on aiding and abetting, the D.C. Circuit 
heavily relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.159 Section 876(b) of the 
Restatement extends civil liability for the tort of a third party to those who 
knowingly provide significant help to the third party in violating their duty.160 
Halberstam acknowledged that aiding and abetting has not seen wide recogni-
tion in the civil context in Article III courts, and Central Bank of Denver added 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See Doe I, 395 F.3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (noting that Erie circumscribes Article 
III courts’ ability to create federal common law). See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938) (imposing limits on the creation of federal common law). 
 154 See Doe I, 395 F.3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (pointing out Erie exceptions to federal 
common law); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (noting 
that federal courts can only create common law on a small number of issues such as when the “rights 
and obligations” of the U.S. are involved, or when there is disagreement between states); United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (finding Article III courts can make law to 
address congressional silence). 
 155 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 771 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (finding knowledge mens rea); Khulumani, 
504 F.3d at 286–89 (Hall, J., concurring) (same); see also Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 35 (favoring interna-
tional law in the choice-of-law inquiry but agreeing that knowledge is the standard under federal 
common law). 
 156 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 
(1994). See generally Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing federal civil 
aiding and abetting liability). 
 157 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 474. 
 158 Id. at 475–76. The defendant’s partner made millions stealing and selling valuables. See id. 
She helped her partner run a stolen gold and silver smelting business, which he ran out of their garage. 
See id. at 475. She kept stock and did other clerical work which implicated her. Id. 
 159 See id. at 477, 478, 481–85, 487–88 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) 
(AM. L. INST. 1979) generally and citing cases that relied on the provision in ascertaining the appro-
priate standard for liability). 
 160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b). 
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that the national legislature has not enacted a catch-all provision for that pur-
pose.161 Nonetheless Halberstam has persuaded at least some circuit court 
judges that the mens rea for ATS aiding and abetting should be knowledge.162 
C. The Law of Nations 
The law of nations, or “international law,” consists of principles sub-
scribed to by a “community” of nations.163 While sometimes officially written 
down as agreements, such laws also include unspoken rules—“customary 
law”—that are followed on a regular basis by many countries because they feel 
legally bound.164 Such laws have to be subscribed to by many countries, but 
not necessarily followed by all, to become customary law.165 In the ATS con-
text, however, following the decision in Sosa, a very high degree of acceptance 
is required.166 Courts often take into account decisions of international courts 
as well as publications of legal scholars to determine if a legal principle quali-
fies as customary law.167 In the context of aiding and abetting liability under 
the ATS, circuit courts have specifically focused on the sources listed in the 
following Subsections to determine the appropriate standard of mens rea.168 
Courts look at these sources because they demonstrate an agreement among 
countries around the world, which customary international law requires.169 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 181 (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 489) (noting that civil 
aiding and abetting has seen very limited application in federal law); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 489 
(noting the limited precedent for the doctrine’s application in the civil context). 
 162 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 771 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 34–35; Khulumani, 
504 F.3d at 287–89 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 163 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1) (AM. L. INST. 1987). 
 164 See id. § 102 cmt. b, c (noting that “customary law” comprises norms adhered to by countries 
due to the belief that it is legally binding); John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing International Law into 
the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433, 458 (2015) (noting that “customary international law” comes in 
to being through the actions of countries that arise from the belief that they are legally required to take 
those actions); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733–34 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 
(1900) for evidentiary guidance on customary law); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708 (citing 
“general consent” among “civilized nations”); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (finding torture is against 
international law because of a “universal” rejection of torture by countries). 
 165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. b. 
 166 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (requiring international norms to be widely accepted to be cognizable 
under the ATS). 
 167 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (holding that customary international law can be 
uncovered through the views of reliable scholars); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 103 (listing authorities of international law); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733–34 (citing The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 for appropriate sources of customary law). 
 168 See infra notes 170–214 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 170–214 and accompanying text. 
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1. Nuremberg Precedents Under Control Council Law No. 10 
Control Council Law No. 10 (“Law No. 10”) is a key source of “custom-
ary international law” for good reason.170 The global recognition of the related 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis (“London Charter”) instated after World War II has been 
acknowledged and approved by courts, legal scholars, and the U.N.171 The 
London Charter authorized the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
which prosecuted the upper echelons of the Nazis, convicting nineteen defend-
ants in its sole trial.172 A few months after the London Charter, the American 
forces adopted Law No. 10 to try less-influential Nazi defendants.173 Under 
Law No. 10, the Americans prosecuted 177 individuals including judges, med-
ics, and state officials.174 Law No. 10’s objective was to “give effect” to the 
London Charter—it shared a common origin with its predecessor, and incorpo-
rated very similar definitions for offenses that could be punished.175 To quote 
the D.C. Circuit, the London Charter provided the “pattern” for the latter.176 
For these reasons, circuit courts have consulted Law No. 10 for customary 
law.177 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See infra notes 171–177 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 271 (remarking on the wide notice of the Charter and the tribunals 
formed under it); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 n.39 (2d Cir. 2003) (referencing the Char-
ter for the meaning of “war crimes”); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 244 n.18 (2d Cir. 
2003) (citing the Charter for customary law); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 
699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that trials conducted by the tribunals under the authority of the Char-
ter received great applaud because the governing laws were recognized throughout the world); Affir-
mation of the Principles of Int’l Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 
95 (I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946) (acknowledging the London Charter); Theodor Meron, Reflections on 
the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 559 (2006) (not-
ing a broad consensus behind Nuremberg laws). 
 172 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis art. 22, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1551 [hereinafter London Charter] (requiring the initial 
proceeding to commence at Nuremberg and granting discretion as to the location of subsequent pro-
ceedings); Meron, supra note 171, at 562 (remarking on the single Nuremberg trial held before the 
International Military Tribunal). 
 173 See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREM-
BERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 6, 250 (1949), https://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMA4-MBAE] (appending Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 (“Law No. 10”)); Meron, supra note 171, at 562 (distinguishing the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal from those under Law No. 10). 
 174 Meron, supra note 171, at 562. 
 175 TAYLOR, supra note 173, at 6–8 (noting and elaborating on objectives of Law No. 10 and 
commenting on comparisons with the London Charter). 
 176 See Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983, 985–86 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (noting similarities between the 
documents). But see TAYLOR, supra note 173, at 8–10 (noting the minor differences). 
 177 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 273 (citing Flores, 414 F.3d at 244 n.18) (noting that the court 
recognizes Law No. 10’s value in unearthing customary law); Flores, 414 F.3d at 244 n.18. (citing a 
discussion of Law No. 10 to establish the proposition that customary law can be applied to non-state 
actors). 
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Both the London Charter and Law No. 10 have provisions for aiding and 
abetting liability without explicitly discussing mens rea.178 The Charter makes 
it a crime to steer, plan, initiate, or assist other crimes listed in the Charter.179 
Law No. 10 similarly lists the various bases for criminal liability, explicitly 
referencing aiding and abetting as a viable theory.180 
The cases tried under Law No. 10 support a knowledge mens rea for aid-
ing and abetting, although there is an argument for a purpose standard.181 Spe-
cifically, in 1949 in United States v. von Weizsaecker (“The Ministries Case”), 
the tribunal refused to find a banker, Karl Rasche, guilty of war crimes alt-
hough he issued large loans to Nazi paramilitary organizations while knowing 
that the money would be used it to commit atrocities.182 The tribunal implicitly 
reasoned—at least according to the Second Circuit’s analysis in Khulumani—
that the requisite purpose was missing.183 In the same case, however, the tribu-
nal ruled against a second defendant, Emil Puhl, a senior banker who knowing-
ly oversaw a deal with Nazis to receive and hold valuable personal belongings 
taken from those killed in Nazi death camps.184 The tribunal convicted Puhl for 
war crimes even while concluding that he likely found the acts associated with 
his dealings “repugnant.”185 The tribunal implicitly accepted that Puhl did not 
oversee the dealings with the purpose to cause the underlying atrocities.186 
Other cases clearly point to a knowledge mens rea for aiding and abetting 
under Law No. 10.187 In 1947 in United States v. Flick, the tribunal held the 
offenders criminally liable for helping Nazi paramilitary forces financially 
while knowing about what the money would be used for.188 Similarly, in 1948 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See infra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
 179 London Charter art. 6, supra note 172, at 1547; see also Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 272 (noting 
the Charter’s expansive reach to defendants that indirectly violate the substantive law defined by it). 
 180 TAYLOR, supra note 173, at 251 (criminalizing aid and abetting of other offenses). 
 181 See infra notes 182–186 and accompanying text. 
 182 See United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), Case No. 11, 14 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 
10, at 621–22 (Nuernberg Mil. Trib. 1949), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-
criminals_Vol-XIV.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CT8-JMPE] [hereinafter 14 TRIALS UNDER CCL NO. 10]. 
In The Ministries Case, twenty-one individuals were tried under eight counts for offenses recognized 
by Law No. 10, including “war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” and “conspiracy to commit 
crimes against peace.” Id. at 1, 314. 
 183 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276 (inferring that the court’s judgment in favor of defendant 
Rasche was because the requisite mens rea was absent). 
 184 See The Ministries Case, 14 TRIALS UNDER CCL NO. 10, supra note 182, at 609, 620–21. The 
defendant deposited items worth “millions of reichsmarks,” such as “gold teeth and fillings, spectacle 
frames, rings, jewelry, and watches.” Id. at 609. 
 185 See id. at 620–21. The tribunal did note that Puhl was more than “a mere messenger,” and that 
he went out of his way to maintain secrecy. Id. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
 188 United States v. Flick, in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1216–1217, 1222–23 (1949). The tribunal 
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in United States v. Ohlendorf, in the trial of Kingelhoefer, the tribunal noted 
that the defendant would be criminally liable for the underlying offenses even 
assuming, as he contended, that his only role in a Nazi death squad was that of 
an interpreter.189 Handing names of people to the death squad with knowledge 
that they would be killed was sufficient to find him criminally liable.190 
2. The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) 
was promulgated in 1998 through an agreement between 120 nations.191 It cre-
ated the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), an international tribunal that 
prosecutes those suspected of perpetrating egregious offenses that affect the 
community of nations collectively.192 The ICC has jurisdiction over offenses 
defined by the Rome Statute in the territory of a signatory country or by a sig-
natory country’s citizen.193 The Rome Statute has been noticed by circuit 
courts as evidence of customary law.194 
The Rome Statute unfortunately does not provide clear guidance on the 
mens rea for aiding and abetting.195 Article 25(3)(c) makes it a crime for an 
individual to help in carrying out an offense with the purpose of helping the 
offense.196 The very next provision, however, also makes it a crime to provide 
support to criminal conduct, actual or attempted, of a group motivated by 
shared “purpose” if that support is “intentional” and the individual has 
“knowledge” about the others’ desire to perpetrate the offense.197 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
made this finding after noting the offenders didn’t subscribe to Nazi “ideologies” and were not “pro-
nouncedly anti-Jewish.” Id. at 1222. 
 189 United States v. Ohlendorf, in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILI-
TARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 568–70 (1949). 
 190 Id. In looking at the mens rea of the defendant, the tribunal also found it relevant that he had 
said that he wanted “Hitler to win the war,” even if it meant millions of deaths and the destruction of 
Europe. Id. 
 191 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 105 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; Understanding the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., at 1, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3NQ-VC47]. 
 192 Id. at 3 (providing a summary overview of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”)). The ICC is based in The Hague. Id. at 4. It is unlike international tribunals like the 
ICTR and the ICTY in that it is a permanent entity that operates outside the constraints of the U.N. 
system. Id. It is also unlike the International Court of Justice, which is a U.N. body that mediates disa-
greement among nations. Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Aziz, 658 F.3d at 399–400 (noting the significance of the Rome Statute due to its wide ac-
ceptance internationally); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (noting that the 139 nations have endorsed 
this agreement and most of those countries, including the biggest proponents of freedom, have ratified 
it.). But see Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 35 (rejecting the Rome Statute as evidence of customary law be-
cause it is a “treaty”). 
 195 See infra notes 196–199 and accompanying text. 
 196 Rome Statute, supra note 191, art. 30. 
 197 Id. 
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Article 30, the Rome Statute’s general mens rea provision refers to “intent” 
and “knowledge”—an individual possesses intent when the individual has the 
purpose to participate in an act and has a grasp on the likely outcome.198 Simi-
larly, an individual has knowledge when the person is alert to a situation or its 
outcome.”199 The Rome Statute is therefore not clear on whether knowledge or 
purpose is the correct mens rea for aiding and abetting.200 
3. International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia 
The ICTR was authorized in 1994 by the UN Security Council to try of-
fenders for genocide and war crimes that occurred in Rwanda in 1994.201 It 
finished its goal in 2015 after convicting sixty-six of the ninety-three defend-
ants charged.202 The ICTY was similarly authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council with the objective of prosecuting those involved in mass atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia.203 Following Nuremberg precedents, the tribunal con-
victed ninety defendants for all kinds of human rights abuses, ending its “man-
date” in December 2017.204 Circuit courts have upheld the ICTY and ICTR 
statutes and judgments as important guides on customary law.205 
The statutes of ICTY and ICTR both support criminal liability for aiding 
and abetting.206 While the statutes are silent on mens rea, judgments of both 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 37–38 (citing Rome Statute for purpose mens rea); Presbyterian 
Church, 582 F.3d at 259 (citing Rome Statute for knowledge mens rea); supra notes 196–199 and 
accompanying text. 
 201 S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Security Council Resolution noted “grave concern” 
various accounts of genocide and methodical, pervasive human rights violations had been recorded. 
Id. at 1. 
 202 Rep. from the President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2015), transmitted by Let-
ter Dated 17 November 2015 from the President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed 
to the President of the Sec. Council, ¶¶ 3, 9, 10, U.N. Doc. S/2015/884 (Nov. 17, 2015). 
 203 S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993). 
 204 Final Report of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the Int’l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
provided to the Sec. Council under Paragraph 6 of Sec. Council Resolution 1534 (2004), transmitted 
by Letter Dated 29 November 2017 to the Sec. Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Sec. Council Reso-
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 205 See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 33 (noticing the weight that ICTY and ICTR carry in this area of 
law); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 274–75 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the ICTY and ICTR 
statutes were meant to incorporate only those principles widely accepted by the international commu-
nity); Doe I, 395 F.3d at 950 (citing judgments of ICTY and ICTR for ATS aiding and abetting mens 
rea). 
 206 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 
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tribunals point to a knowledge standard.207 Specifically, in 1998 in Prosecutor 
v. Frunzidila, the ICTY trial court ascertained the meaning of aiding and abet-
ting liability under the ICTY Statute after conducting a meticulous investiga-
tion of case law from tribunals around the world.208 On mens rea, the trial 
court held that a helper does not need to have the “positive intention” for the 
underlying offense to occur but simply needs “knowledge” that his or her con-
duct will help the principal to commit the offense.209 Similarly, six years later 
in Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, the ICTY’s appeals court confirmed that criminal 
liability for aiding and abetting based on Article 7 of the ICTY statute requires 
a defendant to know that his actions helped the principal to perpetrate the of-
fense.210 Other decisions of the ICTY are consistent with the appeals court’s 
conclusion in Vasiljevic.211 The judgments of the ICTR also seem to be in line 
with the ICTY with regards to the mens rea for aiding and abetting liability.212 
In 2004 in Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the ICTR’s appeals court held that Ar-
ticle 6 of the ICTR statute does not require “specific intent.”213 Following the 
ICTY’s precedent in Kristic, the appeals court held that knowledge was the 
adequate standard.214 
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 210 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT–98–32–A, Appeals Judgment ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004). The issue of aiding and abetting liability was not before the 
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 212 See infra notes 213–214 and accompanying text. 
 213 Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR–96–13–I, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 494, 501 (Dec. 
13, 2004). The appeals chamber dismissed the view that defendant needed “genocidal intent” to attach 
liability. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the appeals chamber relied on Kristic. Id. ¶ 500; see also 
Krstic, Case No. IT–98–33–A, ¶¶ 139–141 (discussing the mens rea issue). 
 214 Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR–96–13–I, ¶ 500; see also Krstic, Case No. IT–98–33–A, at 
¶¶ 139–141 (concluding knowledge to be the appropriate mens rea). 
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III. THE CORRECT MENS REA IS KNOWLEDGE 
Part II of this Note explained the various sources of law that courts have 
looked at to determine the mens rea for ATS aiding and abetting.215 Part III 
synthesizes those sources.216 It further argues that the correct standard is 
knowledge.217 All of the sources discussed instruct that knowledge is the cor-
rect standard.218 Section A discusses the Nuremberg Precedents under Control 
Council Law No. 10 for this proposition.219 Section B discusses ICTY and 
ICTR Case Law.220 Section C explains that the Rome Statute is not clear on the 
issue, but there is a strong argument that it also supports a knowledge mens 
rea.221 Finally, Section D argues that federal common law, to the degree it 
might be relevant, bolsters the overall conclusion.222 
A. Nuremberg Precedents Under Control Council Law No. 10 
Nuremberg case law under Law No. 10 supports a knowledge mens rea 
for aiding and abetting liability.223 The only support to the contrary comes 
from The Ministries Case.224 There, the tribunal refused to find a banker crimi-
nally liable for issuing a loan to Nazi paramilitary forces while knowing that 
the money would be used for atrocities.225 It is not actually clear from that 
opinion, contrary to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals assertion in 2007 in 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., that the tribunal pardoned Rasche be-
cause he did not act purposefully.226 The tribunal simply excused Rasche with-
out making explicit whether knowingly supporting the Nazis was not enough 
for liability or whether the accompanying act of lending money did not satisfy 
the requisite actus reus.227 The latter explanation is more credible.228 After all, 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See supra notes 137–214 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 223–259 and accompanying text. 
 217 See infra notes 223–259 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 223–254 and accompanying text. 
 219 See infra notes 223–230 and accompanying text. 
 220 See infra notes 231–238 and accompanying text. 
 221 See infra notes 239–254 and accompanying text. 
 222 See infra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
 223 See supra notes 170–190 and accompanying text. 
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the tribunal clearly found a knowledge mens rea enough against another de-
fendant, Puhl, in the same case.229 Furthermore, the tribunal’s judgment of 
Puhl is consistent with other cases tried under Law No. 10.230 
B. ICTY & ICTR Case Law 
Similarly, the judgments of the ICTY and ICTR align with Nuremberg 
case law to suggest that the mens rea for ATS aiding and abetting liability 
should be knowledge.231 Some judges have raised concerns nonetheless as to 
the value of these cases for ATS litigation purposes.232 For instance, some 
judges have lamented that the ICTY and ICTR were not permanent courts but 
rather “ad hoc” bodies applying recently enacted legislation.233 Concerns have 
also been raised that these bodies sometimes expound innovative legal theories 
in dicta, which might accidentally deceive other courts.234 These concerns, 
however, are not persuasive.235 First, according to the U.N. Secretary General 
when the ICTY was announced, the relevant statutes of the tribunals sought to 
codify customary law rather than make new law.236 Second, the tribunals are 
bound by their mandates to use customary law only and seem to be aware of 
this duty.237 Finally, the specific standard of liability for aiding and abetting 
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two tribunals are fairly similar. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 274–75 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 237 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275 (citing ICTY cases for this very proposition); Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT–94–1–T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 662 (May 7, 1997) (acknowl-
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applied by these tribunals cannot be dismissed as innovative legal theories or 
dicta when tribunal decisions have undertaken comprehensive surveys of in-
ternational authorities and case law and applied their conclusions to find de-
fendants liable.238 
C. Rome Statute 
Under the Rome Statute, arguments can be made for both knowledge and 
purpose standards for aiding and abetting.239 The knowledge standard is a bet-
ter reading of the statute, however, because it is highly credible and consonant 
with the other sources of law mentioned above.240 Even so, there is support for 
a purpose standard.241 Article 25(3)(c) specifically makes it a crime for an in-
dividual to help in carrying out an offense with the purpose of helping the of-
fense.242 More than a hundred nations have endorsed the statute and ratified it, 
which suggests approval from the international community.243 Perhaps because 
it appears neatly in codified form as opposed to amorphous case law, some 
judges have preferred it over the other sources.244 
Still, the Rome Statute’s authority on the issue is not clear.245 First, it is 
unclear if the statute is even customary law, given that it is better understood as 
a treaty.246 The ATS distinguishes between treaties and customary law.247 The 
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 245 See infra notes 246–249 and accompanying text. 
 246 See Rome Statute, supra note 191, art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting 
or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this 
Statute.”). The D.C. Circuit in Doe VIII cited this language from Article 10 of the Rome Statute to 
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 247 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing jurisdiction for breaches of the “law of nations” or “a 
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D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil questioned the Rome 
Statute’s value for ATS purposes for this reason in 2011.248 The court also not-
ed that the United States is yet to ratify the Statute, which means that it cannot 
fit the “treaty of the United States” prong of the ATS either.249 The Fourth Cir-
cuit has rejected this view, holding that while the Statue may not reflect cus-
tomary law, the fact that it has been endorsed by so many nations makes it 
probative on the issue.250 
That aside, while Article 25(3)(c) the Rome Statute refers to a purpose 
mens rea, other provisions support a knowledge standard.251 For instance, Arti-
cle 25(3)(d) makes it a crime to provide support to criminal conduct, actual or 
attempted, of a group motivated by shared “purpose” if that support is “inten-
tional” and the individual has “knowledge” about the others’ desire to perpe-
trate the offense.252 Similarly, the general mens rea provision in Article 30 re-
fers to “knowledge” and “intent,” defining intent as when the individual has 
the purpose to participate in an act and has a grasp on the likely outcome.253 
This reading of the Rome Statute seems to be consistent with the ICTY’s inter-
pretation in Prosecutor v. Furundzija in 1998 and certainly persuaded the D.C. 
Circuit that the Statute attaches liability for knowingly aiding and abetting.254 
D. Federal Common Law and the Choice of Law Question 
The choice-of-law question in deriving the ATS standard for aiding and 
abetting seems to have been decided to favor international law following the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements in a footnote in Sosa v. Alvarex-
Machain in 2004.255 Assuming, however, that this issue is still relevant—and 
there is definitely some dissent among circuit judges—the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws provides a test that seems to favor federal common 
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law.256 Unfortunately, the Restatement factors are very vague, and judges have 
used them to come to opposite conclusions.257 In this case, however, given that 
the standard of liability under the federal common law—knowledge—is the 
same as that under international law, the choice of law question is irrelevant.258 
There is no need for a choice-of-law inquiry when there is no disagreement.259 
CONCLUSION 
The ATS is an important instrument for non-citizens looking to champion 
human rights in American courts. One of the ways in which litigants can do so 
is by holding corporations accountable for indirectly helping tyrannical gov-
ernments. Aiding and abetting liability is therefore crucial, making it important 
for courts to resolve the level of culpability required before finding corpora-
tions liable for the actions of other governments. That question has not been 
resolved. 
This Note argues that the mental state or mens rea required for ATS aiding 
and abetting liability should be knowledge. First, the knowledge standard is 
supported by highly-regarded authorities of customary international law, as 
evident from the case law of the Nuremberg tribunals applying Law No. 10, 
the ICTR, and the ICTY. There is also considerable support for the knowledge 
standard in the Rome Statute despite some ambiguities. Finally, the knowledge 
standard is well established under federal common law. 
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